The Parashat Ki Tetzé and the laws of war They raise one of the most complex debates in the Torah: how can a text that legitimizes certain wars contain, at the same time, rules intended to limit the power of the victor?
Ki Tetzé, comprising Deuteronomy 21:10–25:19, begins with legislation concerning the captive woman and concludes with the command to remember Amalek. Between these two extremes appear laws regulating the exercise of power and establishing responsibilities for the soldier, the husband, the father, the creditor, the employer, the judge, and the property owner.
Read together with Deuteronomy 20, the parashah allows one to study a true biblical ethics of warHowever, doing so rigorously requires avoiding two extremes: asserting that the Torah permits any conduct during a war or maintaining that it fully anticipates contemporary international humanitarian law.
SEE THE VIDEO OF THIS CLASS IN SPANISH
Deuteronomy and the limits of war
The Torah does not develop a theory of war equivalent to the modern one. the right to warIt features defensive wars, campaigns of conquest, and wars linked to a divine mandate. Later rabbinic tradition organized this diversity through legal categories such as my mitzvah, mandatory war, and the environment is a wastevoluntary war.
In contrast, Deuteronomy does contain several rules regarding conduct during conflict. These include offering peace, exemptions from military service, rules of siege, protection of certain resources, treatment of captives, and camp discipline.
These provisions constitute a possible functional parallel with the jus in belloalthough its foundations, subjects and contents belong to a legal and religious universe very different from the current one.
The peace offer before the fight
Deuteronomy 20 states that before attacking a distant city, Israel must offer it peace. If the city accepts, it is bound by certain conditions; if it rejects the offer, the text allows the war to continue.
Maimonides' tradition extends this obligation to offer peace to both forced and voluntary wars. The principle thus introduces an alternative to armed conflict.
However, this biblical offer should not be confused with a negotiation between states considered equal by contemporary standards. It is a peace conditioned on the subordination of the adversary.
Bal tashjit: limiting destruction during war
One of the best-known principles of Deuteronomy 20 is the prohibition against destroying fruit trees during a siege.
This rule, later related to the principle of bal tashjitIt sets a limit to devastation. War may require the use of resources, but it does not make all destruction legitimate.
Maimonides later extended this principle beyond the military context, applying it also to the unjustified destruction of property, food, buildings, and other resources.
The comparison with current concepts of military necessity is thought-provoking, although the two doctrines should not be equated. Biblical law belongs to its own historical and legal context.
SEE THE VIDEO OF THIS CLASS IN ENGLISH
The captive woman in Ki Tetzé
Deuteronomy 21:10–14 regulates one of the most difficult cases in the parashah: the yes, yes, yes, the captive woman.
The text establishes a procedure that interrupts the immediate exercise of power by the victor. The woman enters the house, goes through a period of mourning, and if the man subsequently ceases to love her, she must be freed. She cannot be sold or turned into merchandise again.
Rabbinic tradition also does not present this situation as an ideal. Kiddushin 21b interprets the rule as a concession to negative human impulses.
However, recognizing these restrictions does not eliminate the central problem: the woman remains in a situation of captivity and the text does not formulate a concept of autonomous sexual consent equivalent to the contemporary one.
Therefore, a rigorous reading must simultaneously maintain two elements: the existence of limits to the power of the captor within the ancient world and the profound distance between that system and modern standards on freedom and sexual violence.
The holiness and discipline of the camp
Deuteronomy 23:10–15 requires that the military camp be kept clean and that soldiers refrain from certain behaviors considered improper.
The biblical justification is fundamentally religious: the divine presence accompanies the army and, therefore, the camp must preserve its sanctity.
Ramban develops a particularly significant ethical interpretation. War can unleash cruelty, anger, looting, and other destructive behaviors. Precisely for this reason, those who fight need reinforced moral discipline.
The sanctity of the camp thus becomes a fundamental assertion: participating in a war does not automatically suspend moral obligations.
Military exemptions and protection of civilian life
Deuteronomy also includes exemptions related to the house, the vineyard, marriage, and fear.
The newlywed, for example, is removed from military service and certain public obligations for a year to dedicate himself to his new family.
These rules show that military mobilization does not completely absorb social life. Family, work, and personal projects retain their own value.
Rabbinic tradition, however, establishes differences according to the nature of the war. In certain mandatory wars, the exemptions cease to apply.
Amalek: Memory, Violence, and Responsibility
Ki Tetzé concludes with the mandate to remember Amalek, the enemy that attacked the weak, exhausted, and lagging people of Israel.
The memory of Amalek occupies a central place in Jewish tradition. However, the text raises a profound tension: Israel must remember the aggression and, at the same time, erase the memory of the aggressor.
Later interpretations developed different ways of understanding this obligation. Some turned Amalek into a symbol of evil; others limited the possibility of historically identifying his descendants.
Applying the name Amalek to contemporary enemies presents a significant hermeneutical risk. It can transform a political conflict into outright enmity and erase individual responsibility.
The mitzvah environment and the reshut environment
The Mishnah, the Talmud, and later Maimonides systematized the biblical wars using halakhic categories.
The my mitzvah designates certain wars considered obligatory, while the the environment is a waste This corresponds to voluntary wars. This classification has consequences regarding the authority required to initiate a war and the exemptions of combatants.
Voluntary warfare, for example, requires specific institutional authorization in rabbinic sources.
This structure is significant because it limits the possibility of understanding war as a purely personal or charismatic decision of the ruler: political power also remains subject to rules.
Ki Tetzé and international humanitarian law
The comparison between the laws of war of the Torah and international humanitarian law requires special caution.
Contemporary law develops principles such as distinction, proportionality, precaution, humanity, military necessity, and individual responsibility. Some biblical provisions may engage with these principles, especially restrictions on destruction, military discipline, and certain limits during sieges.
But similarity does not mean identity or direct legal affiliation.
The Torah belongs to the long intellectual genealogy of reflections on the limits of war, but it is not the direct or exclusive legal source of the Geneva Conventions.
Furthermore, certain biblical texts, such as the because of meThe wars against Amalek or some accounts of captives and defeated populations are incompatible with fundamental principles of contemporary international law if they are literally transposed to our time.
Does the Torah humanize or legitimize war?
The question does not admit a simple answer.
Deuteronomy contains rules that restrict certain abuses of military power: it protects resources, regulates sieges, establishes exemptions, disciplines the camp, and limits some forms of exploitation of captives.
At the same time, it preserves institutions and mandates that belong to the political, patriarchal, and military world of the ancient Near East and that are morally and legally incompatible with contemporary standards.
That's why studying Ki Tetzé and the laws of war It requires distinguishing between biblical text, rabbinic interpretation, historical context, and modern law.
The most rigorous conclusion is not to present the Torah as a modern humanitarian code or as an unlimited legitimization of violence. Its fundamental contribution to the debate lies in a more difficult tension: even where war is considered legitimate, the use of force is not necessarily outside the bounds of all norms.
This tension between power and limits makes Ki Tetzé a particularly relevant text for studying how legal and religious traditions have attempted to answer a question that remains open: What obligations does a human being retain when he has power over his enemy?
